Animal Studies Bibliography
Plous, S. 1993. Psychological Mechanisms in the Human Use of Animals. Journal of Social Issues , 49(1):11-52.
Plous argues that psychologists should join the study of animals and society by studying how people think about their use of animals. Past research has shown that people experience two conflicting beliefs: we are concerned animals' well-being but also believe in using animals in particular situations. Plous outlines four things that might explain how we reconcile this conflict.
First, we dissociate our consumptive practices from our awareness that they cause pain or suffering. We use euphemisms for killing and torture of animals, depersonalizing them in order to make aggression more acceptable. We describe our food in terms different from those we use for the live animals. We describe animals as lower or subhuman or as inanimate objects, often as property or machines. We remove all traces of personality (e.g. eyes, head, face, feet) from animal products before we see them. Animal industries are remote both in physical plant and in media coverage, meaning that we have very low awareness of what goes on in our treatment of animals. Finally, we are socialized to ignore how we use animals--for example, children see old-fashioned farms not agro-businesses, are taught that meat is essential to human diets, and are discouraged from feeling affection toward animals that we consume.
Second, we employ numerous mechanisms to reduce dissonance when the above dissociation is threatened. Some may avoid the topic, argue that human survival requires animal use or that it is natural to the human species, or argue that using animals causes similar amounts of suffering as any alternatives would. Some limit their own use of animals. Some argue, against overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that animals do not feel pain as humans do, that animals desire to be used by humans, or that animals are not intelligent or self-aware.
Third, Plous argues that we justify our treatment of animals by construing them as an outgroup. In research among human groups, outgroup members are considered inferior, unattractive, homogenous, and more tolerant of pain. A principle that explains this outgroup bias is Plous' fourth point: the Similarity Principle (In general, people give more consideration to others who are perceived as similar to themselves than to those who are perceived as dissimilar). This principle applies in several different situations: we more frequently offer help to similar others; are more concerned about the pain of similar others; find similar others more attractive and likable; and punish more harshly when the victim of aggression was similar to us. Though these similarity principles have been demonstrated among human groups, they have not been researched with respect to animals, and Plous cautions that different types of similarity may function differently. In particular, similarity may matter only in cases where are similar in observable and valued characteristics. He also notes that there is some indication that dissimilarity, serving as a filtering technique, is actually more important than similarity in determining how we treat others.
Plous illustrates each point with small, usually unreplicated studies of people's attitudes toward and knowledge about animal use. These studies both lend support to his suggested points and indicate areas for future research. He also suggests that social psychological principles regarding human groups (e.g. altruism, diffusion of responsibility, etc.) should be extended to human-animal interactions.
